Health, 2010, 2006) . 24 25 We understand politics to involve a conflict in meanings as well as interests (Fischer, 2003) . Insight 26 into the differences in meaning ascribed to health services by different social groups has come from 27 the field of cultural geography. Brown (2003) , for example, has argued that proponents of hospital M A N U S C R I P T
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3 closure from a rational planning perspective 'neglect to locate the hospital, and in particular the 1 district general hospital, within its broader context' (p. 489). He draws on the work of Kearns and 2 Joseph (1993) and Pred (1983) to show how health services are important to people's ideas about 3 local identity and 'sense of place'. Here 'sense of place' refers to the consciousness of a locality from 4 the 'insider perspective'. It is based on the understanding that a place is more than the sum of its 5 material characteristics, it is the centre of meanings, values, significance and emotional attachment. Thus the political contest over hospital planning can be understood as a conflict in frameworks of 8 meaning, between the instrumental rationality instantiated in both management and medicine 9 (Rhodes, 2013; Good, 1994) and the perspective of community groups for whom health services are 10 not just health services but are replete with social and emotional attachments. Our concern in this 11
paper is not with how services should be provided but with exploring the role of policy in political 12 contests. Following Shore and Wright (1997) we ask how, in this instance, does policy 'work' as an 13 instrument of power? 14 15 Drawing from an ethnographic study of hospital planning in England we consider how policy is 16 espoused in national policy documents, how this shifts over time and how it is articulated and enacted 17 in practice. Following Wright and Reinhold (2011) our approach is one of 'studying through', that is 18 following a policy through relations between actors, institutions and discourses across space and time. 19 We found that power operated through policy texts and in the practices of policy implementation in 20
ways that were often difficult to see. Central to these processes were medical knowledge and expertise 21 which served to frame the debate and undermine public involvement in decision-making. 22 23 24 Frames and framing in policy processes 25 26 Our approach is informed by the anthropology and sociology of policy (Shore, Wright and Pero 2011; 27 M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 4 approach views policy as a social practice that is essentially linguistic. It presupposes that policy is a 1 site of political contestation and uses discourse theory to illuminate the operation of power. A central 2 concern is with unsettling the 'certainties and orthodoxies that govern the present' (Shore and Wright 3 1997, p.17) so as to create room for alternative policy options. 4 5 From this stance, one way to view policy texts is as rhetorical strategies intended to convince other 6 actors of the legitimacy of a course of action by using language to connect it to broader social values 7 (Suddabury and Greenwood, 2005) . Beyond the often quite obvious attempts at persuasion, there are 8 the less visible discursive acts of 'naming and framing' that have the effect of making a certain course 9 of action appear inevitable whilst marginalising alternatives (Shore and Wright, 1997) . Much of the 10 literature on naming and framing draws on Foucault's (1979 Foucault's ( , 1980 insights on the exercise of power 11 in modern societies. Specifically, his observations on the way that language constructs the social 12 world, the immanence of knowledge and power and how the operation of power becomes hidden from 13 view. So, for example, Edelman (1988) acknowledges a debt to Foucault in his analysis of how policy 14 problems are constructed in discourse. In contrast to the rational approach to policy, which sees 15 governments responding to policy problems that exist 'out there', Edelman argues that policy 16 problems are created in the policy proposals that are offered as solutions. Similarly Stone (1988) 17 argues that policy texts are a political process of establishing definitions. The classifications and 18 categories used in policy not only reflect a particular view of the world, they have consequences for 19 people's lives. They 'confer advantages and disadvantages, rewards and penalties, permissions and 20 restrictions, or power and powerlessness' (p.309). 21 Ball (1990) has described policies as 'power/knowledge configurations par excellence'. Policies, 23 according to Ball 'embody claims to speak with authority, they legitimate and initiate practices in the 24 world, and they privilege certain visions and interests ' (p.22) . Similarly, Shore and Wright draw on 25
Foucault when they argue that: 26
Policies are most obviously political phenomena, yet it is a feature of policies that their political 1 nature is disguised by the objective, neutral, legal-rational idioms in which they are portrayed. 2
In this guise policies appear to be mere instruments for promoting efficiency and effectiveness 3 (1997, p.8). 4
5
Scholars differ on the extent to which they see the operation of power in policy texts as intentional. 6
Some focus on the uses of discourse, emphasising the intentional mobilization of discourses for 7 political purposes. Bacchi (2000) , for example, attempts to capture this in her notion of 'category 8 politics'. Others focus more on the effects of discourse, emphasising the way underlying assumptions 9 and presuppositions of policies constrain what can be said or done. Ball, for example, sees the 10 constraints imposed by discourse as arising from institutional practices and power relations and insists 11 that the effects of discourse 'cannot simply be reduced to the intentions and ambitions of a few key 12 actors' (1990, p.155). Similarly, Shapiro (1992) speaks of the operation of discourse as exceeding the 13 intentions of individuals. According to Shapiro, when people speak they participate, often 14 unreflectingly, in an existing discursive practice that 'constructs worlds of submission and 15 domination' (1981, p.38). So for example, doctors dominate patients not so much through the 16 strategic use of language but through the fact that discursive practices construct 'doctors' and 17 'patients'. 18
19
To explore the operation of power in policy processes we employed, as a point of departure, Rein and 20
Schön's (1993) concepts of 'frames' and 'framing'. The concept of interpretive frames stems from the 21 work of Goffman (1974) who defined frames as organizing principles that govern the meaning we 22 assign to social events (p.10). Rein and Schön have applied the notion of frames to the study of 23 public policy, using the term to refer to 'a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, 24 problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on' (1993, p.146). Rein and Schön argue that 25 policy actors have different frames that lead them to see things differently and support different 26 courses of action concerning 'what is to be done, by whom, and how to do it' (1993, p.147). Hospital planning exemplifies what Schön and Rein call 'intractable policy controversies'. Intractable 1 policy controversies are 'marked by contention, more or less acrimonious, more or less enduring ' 2 (1994, p.3) . A feature of policy controversies is that they are resistant to resolution by appeals to 3 evidence or reasoned argument. This is because opposing parties hold different frames which lead 4 them to differ in their view of what facts are important or to give the same facts different 5 interpretations. 6 7 Schön and Rein distinguish between action frames and rhetorical frames. Action frames are those 8 implicit in the content of policies while rhetorical frames are those that underlie the persuasive use of 9 argument. Sometimes the same frame serves both functions but more often they are different. A 10 rhetorical frame may obscure the underlying action frame: 11
12
Frames are about action, and the desire to do something usually leads to a commitment to make 13 the action we seek realizable. We often do so by 'hitching on' to a dominant frame and its 14 conventional metaphors, hoping to purchase legitimacy for a course of action actually inspired 15 by different intentions (Rein and Schön 1993, p.151) . 16 
17
The concepts of 'frames' and 'framing' allow for the consideration of the operation of power both 18 with and without intention. Rein and Schön describe 'frames' as 'part of the natural, taken-for-granted 19 world' so that 'we are often unaware of their role in organizing our perceptions, thoughts and actions ' 20 (1993, p.151) . Elsewhere they speak of the strategic act of 'framing'. We apply these concepts to the 21 case of hospital planning in England, looking at how a policy to centralise hospital services is framed 22
in policy texts and in the processes of policy implementation. 23
The topic of this study emerged during ethnographic fieldwork conducted for a larger project 1 (Eworthy et al, 2010). Whilst attending board meetings of a variety of local healthcare organisations 2 we noticed repeated appeals to the 'clinical case for change' when managers presented plans to close 3 hospital departments. This rationale contradicted earlier planning documents that contained a financial 4 rationale. We were struck by the rhetorical force of these appeals which felt, to us, to have the effect 5 of shutting down debate. This seemed significant given the stated policy objective of involving 6 patients and the public in decision-making. The extent and implications of this observation then 7 became the focus of data collection and analysis. In attempting to produce an account that made sense of this initial observation we tested our ideas 10 against data collected from a range of sources including documents, observations of meetings (n=12), 11
formal interviews (n=52) and informal conversations with national policy makers, local National 12
Health Service (NHS) managers and senior hospital doctors (known in the NHS as 'consultants'). In In line with our use of discourse theory, our analysis presupposed that text and talk are social 21 practices and focused on the resources (interpretive repertoires, identities and category systems) 22 drawn on by actors in those practices (Potter, 1997) . Interview transcripts, fieldnotes and planning 23 documents were examined for regularities in the form of assumptions, categories, logics, claims and 24 modes of articulation (Miller, 1997) . We drew on this data to construct an account of the way a policy 25 of centralising hospital services was framed in national policy texts and how this was translated in 26 practice. Our analysis is based on the entire dataset. Pseudonyms are used for individuals and 27 organisations.
In the following section we present our findings. We describe first how a policy to centralise hospital 2 services became reframed in national policy documents. We then show how this same framing was 3 deployed by local health services managers seeking to implement the policy in one locality in 4
England. out as a key objective the relocation of services from hospital to non-hospital settings. This policy was 12 called 'Care closer to home' and throughout the document reference was made to providing care 13 'closer to home', 'in the community' and 'in more local settings'. The White Paper presented the 14 policy as a rational response to technological developments that enable health care to be delivered in 15 more local settings, an increase in long-term conditions and patient expectations for health care that is 16 convenient. In this technological and social context, 'reconfiguration' of health services was presented 17 as a means of improving patient access and responsiveness. The emphasis was on providing hospital 18 services 'in more local settings'. Significantly less attention was given to the corollary, closing, or 19 downgrading district general hospitals. This is mentioned directly only once, in a section of the 20 document where the findings from a public consultation are being used to indicate public support for 21 the policy: 22
Participants in the 'Your health, your care, your say' consultation said they wanted more care 24
provided in community settings. The majority favoured increased investment in the latter, even geriatrics (Philp, 2007) , cancer (Richards, 2007) , diabetes (Roberts, 2007) , maternity and 23 paediatrics (Shribman, 2007a; . The recurring theme of these documents was that while 24 some services can be provided locally, other care needs to be centralised to ensure the best health The proposals contained in the above policy documents are described as 'evidence-based'. For 4 example, the proposals in the first Darzi report are described as 'rooted in the evidence' and 'from 5 reviews of the literature and data' (Darzi, 2007b, p.4) . In some cases there were references to studies 6 of the relationship between hospital volume and outcomes. In other cases references were to standards 7 published by the Royal Colleges. These specify catchment populations, staffing patterns, workload 8
and inter-professional linkages. When these were retrieved as part of analysis they were found to be 9 predominantly based on expert opinion. In some instances the basis of recommendations were 10 surprisingly arbitrary. This is illustrated in the following recommendation from the first Darzi report: 11
12
Obstetric units should have a consultant presence for at least 98 hours a week. 10 This will 13 require fewer obstetric units than now in order to ensure there is an adequate workforce, that 14 staff gain sufficient experience and that the units are affordable. (Darzi, 2007b , p.46) 15
16
The superscript notation is in the original document. It is standard scientific notation to indicate a 17 citation. We assumed that the citation would be to research-based evidence in support of this 18 recommendation. Instead we found a footnote that read as follows: 19 20 The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists have suggested that units should be 21 moving towards having consultant presence 24/7. We are not convinced that this is essential for 22 a high quality service, so we have set a more conservative requirement of a consultant presence 23 of 98 hours a week, which would be a significant increase in some units. (Darzi, 2007b, p. (Russell et al, 2008) . In the policy discourse for hospital planning the 1 evidence for clinical effectiveness is emphasised to the exclusion of other considerations. This, 2 together with the sometimes tenuous links to empirical research, suggests that these appeals were in 3 large part rhetorical. Here the use of scientific vocabulary serves to establish plans for changing how 4
services are provided as based on objective knowledge and independent of political interests. 5
6
The other recurring motif was an appeal to 'safety'. The following is an excerpt from field notes. It is 7 a quote from a national politician speaking at a think tank seminar: 8 9
In Manchester they were facing resistance to changes to maternity services, but once we could 10 make the argument that the way we are doing things is killing you and killing your babies it 11 was easier to make these decisions. (Field notes, January 2008) 12
13
An appeal to 'safety' is among the most powerful rhetorical motifs because it is seemingly 14 unanswerable -who would argue against safety? An appeal to the safety of babies is the 'trump card' 15 (Green, 2000) . 16 17
That this is an instance of strategic reframing is also suggested by national guidance issued to regional 18 offices. At this time it was the role of regional offices to ensure that national policy was incorporated In the next section we consider how the framing of clinical necessity travelled from the national level 4 of government policy to the level of practice. Hughes (1996) has described local health service 5 managers as essentially 'rhetoricians'. He argues that local managers must act in a political context of 6
competing interest groups and that this process can be understood as an interplay of rhetorics, rather 7 than the more familiar conception of negotiation and bargaining. The tendency since the 1980s to 8 devolve responsibility for hard decisions downwards has made it necessary for local managers to 9 explain and to justify. They must persuade other players that one course of action is better than others. 10 This is not to say that the use of rhetoric is necessarily about manipulation or deception, as Hughes 11 demonstrates, it may be a way by which local actors make sense of changes in policy over which they 12 have no control. In the context of our study, we consider how local managers introduced changes to 13 hospital services. We look at how managers sought to persuade other stakeholders of the nature of the 14 problem and enrol them in the process of implementation. as in other areas of England, were involved in plans to centralise hospital services. These plans had a 23 long and complicated history whereby the rationale for change, the organisations involved and the 24 details of the plans had all changed over time and continued to change whilst we were in the field. 25
26
The plans were being led by the local commissioner, at this time the 'Primary Care Trust' (PCT). 'Fit 27
for the future', as the plans were known, had been instigated by regional planners (the Strategic Over the period of fieldwork we observed a reframing of the issue, from a financial to a clinical 20 rationale for change. The clinical rationale mirrored the framing which we have described above as 21 emerging in national policy documents at this time. The features and impact of this framing will be 22 illustrated with two events: a 'co-design' workshop and a provider Board meeting. 23
24
The co-design workshop 25
26
Echoing the enrolment of political elites in the formulation of national policy, the commissioner had 27 contracted a firm of management consultants to run a two-day 'clinical workshop' with local doctors.
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Whilst talk on the front stage can be expected to display deference to values such as rationality, 3 objectivity, and public involvement, talk on the backstage gives more recognition to the political 4 dimensions of planning (Degeling, 1996) . An example of 'front stage talk' can be found in the report 5 of the workshop published by the firm of management consultants and which describes the process as in three groups -one for each clinical area. They were asked to use their expert opinion and 12 judgement to develop sustainable service models that showed the levels of care and appropriate 13 settings for them. They then considered these clinical models and discussed them with regard to 14 options for service reconfiguration. 15
16
In contrast, in subsequent interviews with a range of local actors, the purpose of the workshop was 17 referred to in terms of 'presentation' and 'marketing' of the commissioner's plans. Local doctors who 18 had participated in the workshop expressed resentment at what they saw to be the superficial and 19 strategic nature of their involvement: 20 21 We were all very, very cross about that because it was only a short workshop, when you think 22 of the scale of what's discussed, to achieve some sort of meaningful outcome after two half 23 days is pretty ambitious. It was one afternoon and the next morning and the first session was 24 supposedly fairly broad discussion without any specifics and then the next was more focussed 25
on what would happen if you reduced sites or services at sites. But, the participants from here 26 felt that our input was effectively ignored and certainly we said quite a lot of things and almost 27 none of it were recorded. You felt that whoever wrote it had decided it all beforehand and the Closing a hospital in this kind of area is not going to be easy, that's why they tried to sort of 4
shift it towards us clinicians having all these meetings, so we would show that we could do it 5 without affecting clinical services so trying to make it look like the clinicians were suggesting it 6 which was quite a crafty move and caused a lot of resentment among-a lot of my colleagues 7
were saying 'no, no don't take part in the process because otherwise you'll be blamed when it The co-design workshop was one of a number of ways the commissioner had involved doctors in the 11 process of implementation. It had also enrolled doctors to defend the plans during public consultation. 12
As one PCT manager explained: what they want to see is an actual consultant saying 'this only makes sense -why wouldn't we 18 want to do it?' and so that's why it was always essential that we had their engagement. 19 20 In this way the commissioner can be seen to be following the guidance issued by the Department of 21
Health on how local plans to close services should be implemented. Thus local managers were not just 22
implementing national policy but adopting the recommended strategy to 'sell' the plans to the public. 23
The doctors enrolled in implementation were without exception doctors occupying management roles. 24
The findings of our study accord with similar studies that have interpreted these practices as the co- public who attended the meeting opposed the plans to close the maternity unit. 10
11
The plans for closing the maternity unit were set out in a meeting paper, again with the title 'The 12
clinical case for change'. A verbal presentation was given by the clinical lead (a medical manager). 13
Although she was speaking in her capacity as a manager, she began her presentation by listing her Directive (legislation that limits doctors' working hours). 18
19
During the meeting vocal opposition to the plans came from the local MP, medical staff, a trade union 20 leader and members of the public. For the most part the rationale for closing the maternity unit was 21 challenged 'on its own terms'. For example, the local MP argued that Wildbridge hospital met the 22
Royal College standards for consultant staffing, it was Smithton hospital (where maternity services 23
were to be centralised) that failed to meet the standard, and even so, the standard only applied to high 24 risk populations, while Wildbridge had a low risk population. Similarly, a senior hospital doctor 25 contested the Trusts' claims that the changes were necessary to improve safety. The doctor presented 26 mortality statistics to show that the outcomes for Wildbridge hospital were better than for Smithton, 27
and lower than the national average. Submissions from members of the public drew on personal M A N U S C R I P T
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experience and an assessment of local needs (such as no other hospital in reasonable distance and a 1 growing population of families who will require maternity services) to argue that the plans reduced 2 local access to services. 3
4
The Board then voted with the majority of the Board voting in favour so that the plans to close 5 maternity services at the hospital were agreed. It was clear that the members of the public who 6 attended the meeting were dissatisfied, especially with what they saw to be the weakness of the 7 rationale and that a decision had been made prior to public consultation. 8
9
Policy elites have argued that, among the public, there is a lack of understanding of the 'technical 10 patient safety arguments' for closing hospitals (Farrington-Douglas and Brooks 2007). However it is 11 apparent from this board meeting that it was not that the public did not understand the technical 12
arguments, it was that they did not accept them. Similar findings have been reported elsewhere 13 (Haycock et al, 1999) . Stakeholders were confident in arguing against the plans, both 'on their own 14 terms' with regard to the weakness of the evidence for improvements in safety, and in drawing 15 attention to other considerations, such as access. They also mobilised alternative measures of 'safety'. 16
In this case a particular and concrete understanding of safety was set against the universal and 17 abstract. 18
19
Thus, as rhetorical strategy, the clinical rationale was not successful in that other stakeholders were more tangible consequences of this framing in the Shire was that it enabled NHS organisations to 7 avoid public consultation. In the following excerpt LJ is talking to a PCT manager. This time it is 8
December 2007, and the manager is talking about the commissioner's plans: 9
So we went through a whole load of hoops really, to get to where we are which is basically that 11
there are a number of Royal College clinical best practice requirements that have gone out as 12 commissioning intentions to the providers and they've come back with proposals, some of 13 which are about greater networking, or indeed moving services to one hospital site, rather than 14
having them spread across all three and it was agreed by the [health overview and scrutiny 15 committee] that we could effectively go out...through engagement rather than formal 16
consultation. So we were all set to do formal consultation and then at the end it looked like we 17 could say effectively well this is just about good practice and why would anyone disagree with 18 us following Royal College guidance? 19 20 The assumption, in this excerpt, is that planning health services is a technical exercise, a rational 21 process of applying scientific evidence. However, as Lasswell (1936) that takes what is essentially a political problem and recasts it in the neutral language of science 24 (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.196 ). A key dimension of this strategy was the co-optation of political and managerial elites from the 10 medical profession (Waring 2014) . At the national level this involved appointing medico-politicians 11
to produce Department of Health policy documents. Until the 1980s the influence of the profession on 12
national policy was such that Dunleavy described it as an example of 'the professionalised state' 13 (Dunleavy, 1981) . However since then the influence of the profession on national policy has declined 14 as that of management has increased (Salter, 2003; Harrison and Ahmad, 2000) . We argue that the 15 involvement of political elites in the formulation of national policy on hospital planning can best be 16 understood as co-optation in the interests of policy makers, rather than a resurgence of professional Nor was the clinical rationale the only framing in play. We found that appeals to clinical leadership 5 were often coupled with an appeal to public involvement. We interpret this as reflecting the fact that 6 policy makers and local managers must attend to the concomitant policy imperative of public 7 involvement in decisions about service delivery. Martin and Learmonth (2012) go further, 8
highlighting how health service staff and members of the public 'are increasingly represented not just 9
as the objects of policy interventions, but as subjects implicated in policy design' (p.282). They argue 10 that claims about engaging clinicians and the public in policy formulation can best be understood as a 11 co-optive means of 'governing at a distance' (Rose and Miller 1992) . 12 
13
We found that the clinical rationale did not persuade other stakeholders of the need for change. But it 14
is not simply that the rhetoric is unconvincing, the tactics themselves, in so far as they are recognised 15 by other actors, engender distrust. This is likely to produce the opposite of what is intended, for as 16
Hajer (1995) has shown in relation to environmental policy, it is trust, rather than simply empirical 17 evidence, that is key to the acceptance of change in intractable controversies. 18
19
Beyond the more obvious use of rhetoric, the policy 'worked' through the discursive act of framing. 20
Frames present an interpretation of the way things are, of what should be done and who should do it. 21
Through the use of framing, policy texts channel thinking in a particular direction and make a 22 particular course of action appear self-evident. In this case centralisation is framed as a means of 23 improving clinical effectiveness. However, if the goal is improving health outcomes, there are 24 alternative courses of action. In maternity care, for example, outcomes may be improved by action to 25 reduce obesity and diabetes in the population, by improving uptake of antenatal care, improving 26 identification of 'at risk' women in the third trimester and so forth. Even taking a more narrow 27 concern with medical staffing and training, for any given objective, such as training doctors, decision means that it is kept off the agenda. 21
22
Fieldwork for this study was undertaken between 2006 and 2009. Our intention was to use 23 hospital planning during this period as a case study to explore the use and effects of framing in 24 policy and practice. We therefore sought to make a more general contribution to the understanding 25 of the role of policy in political contests. Moreover, in the current economic climate the issue of 26 hospital planning has become more acute as local managers are facing pressure to reduce costs. framings have continued to shift and in recent years there has been more emphasis in policy texts 1 on the need to close facilities in the face of austerity and to move spending from acute to 2 community services. There has also been an increasing emphasis on 'co-producing' plans for 3 service change with the public, suggesting a continuing reliance on a form of governmentality as 4 described by Martin and Learmonth (2012) . Nonetheless, the framing that we have explicated in According to central guidance distributed to these organisations, the value of having clinicians as 19 commissioners includes: 20
21
Better involvement and engagement of local people to adopt improved services and move from 22 familiar but out-dated services based on the focus on quality and outcomes and the trusted 23 positions held in communities. (NHS Commissioning Board Authority 2012, p8). In this study we explored how a policy to centralise hospital services was presented in national policy 5 documents and implemented in one locality in England. We identified a shift in the framing of the 6 policy, from one that presented the policy as a means of improving access and making services more 7 responsive to patients, to one of clinical necessity. In the latter framing plans to close hospital 8 departments or entire hospitals were presented as clinical decisions that were based on the evidence 9 and necessary to ensure safety. We have interpreted this framing as a rhetorical strategy employed to 10 convince other stakeholders of the need for change. Although the persuasive power of a rationale of 11 clinical necessity is limited, a more insidious form of power operates in the way it shapes how the 12 problem is understood, which solutions are considered (and which are not) and who is included in 13 decision-making. 
